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 On two-sided peer-to-peer platforms there exists a supply side (producers) and a 
demand side (consumers). Platform owners provide the platforms that assist in efficiently 
matching producers and consumers and an infrastructure that producers can take 
advantage of to signal quality to consumers. This study examines the effects of producer 
signals on product performance in the context of Airbnb, a peer-to-peer home sharing 
platform. Adjusting for producers with multiple listings, the analysis uses 77,445 listings 
from the platform to produce regression models which tests whether signals are positively 
related to product performance and if the relationship between producer signals and 
product performance is moderated by product type. Results show that while producer 
signals are important to product performance, there is minimal support for the assumption 
that signals vary by product type. Results also show that certain product attributes may be 
more important than producer signals in some contexts. Based on these findings, business 
and theoretical implications are discussed as well as directions for future research. 
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From transportation to daily errands, many aspects of life have been transformed 
by the emergence of the sharing economy and the peer-to-peer platforms that inhabit it. 
The sharing economy is defined as a market for accessing products and services on a 
temporary basis rather than owning them (Puschmann & Alt, 2016). Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
platforms play an important role in this market, connecting supply- and demand-side 
participants (i.e. platform producers and consumers). These platforms often disrupt or 
change traditional industries like rental/hospitality services, taxi services, car rentals, and 
even lending (Ryu et al., 2019). This change in consumer behavior is facilitated and 
amplified by evolving social networks and electronic markets (i.e. P2P 
platforms).(Puschmann & Alt, 2016). 
A key aspect of the value that peer-to-peer platform owners create for customers 
is the efficiency with which they match supply with demand (Morse, 2015). For example, 
a 2016 analysis shows that, on average, Uber drivers achieve more capacity utilization 
than taxi drivers in major United States cities. One reason for Uber drivers’ superior 
performance is the presence of the Uber platform, which provides an efficient matching 
tool (Cramer & Krueger, 2016). On platforms like eBay, Prosper, and Airbnb where 
consumers and producers are not automatically matched, the platforms provide a space 
for producers to communicate quality, competence, and trustworthiness. Thus, signaling 
theory is used in recent literature to understand the importance of signaling producer 
quality in order to improve product performance. 
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Recent P2P platform studies simply use product prominence (number of reviews) 
as a marker of performance (Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). However, a 
more comprehensive assessment of product performance on P2P platforms based on 
consumer evaluations of products and producers has received relatively less scholarly 
attention. By measuring product performance with both review quality and review 
volume, this study improves the state of P2P platform literature and provides a more 
robust assessment of performance. Taeuscher (2019) finds that a product’s perceived 
quality and prominence positively impacts sales performance. This is proposed to occur 
because product quality and product prominence are reputation signals that make it easier 
for consumers to have confidence in the products they are pursuing (Taeuscher, 2019). 
Specifically, rating scores and rating volume are markers of perceived product quality 
and product prominence in online markets, respectively (Taeuscher, 2019). Thus, this 
study extends prior research by considering the impact of producers’ reputation signals 
on both product quality (rating score) and product prominence (number of reviews).  
In addition, there lacks an in-depth understanding of the importance and 
effectiveness of particular reputation signals by product type. Seminal works on signaling 
theory do not fully address the importance of considering the type of product (Akerlof, 
1970; Lee et al., 2005).  Yet, the performance of different types of products, such as 
entire homes or single rooms on Airbnb’s platform, may be influenced by different 
reputation signals, and thus require different approaches to marketing. In turn, 
understanding the importance of reputation signals by product type has practical 
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implications for both platform owners and platform producers. Building on these insights, 
this study examines the following research questions:  
RQ1: How do platform producers’ reputation signals contribute to the 
performance of their products on peer-to-peer platforms? 
RQ2: How does product type moderate the relationship between platform 





Two-Sided Peer-to-Peer Platforms  
Firms produce goods or services, which they sell to customers to generate revenue 
and profits. However, firms operating as platforms rely on platform producers to create 
and deliver goods and services (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). At the same time, they do not 
directly sell to customers but facilitate the interactions and transactions of platform 
producers and consumers (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Such platforms have traditionally 
existed in the gaming and payment systems. For example, platform owners like Microsoft 
X-Box, Sony Play Station, and Nintendo Wii, must encourage game developers to create 
content compatible with their platforms while also encouraging gamers to purchase that 
content (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). Similarly, payment system operators must encourage 
merchants and cardholders to interact with each other in order to make a profit (Rochet & 
Tirole, 2006).  In these two-sided markets, platform owners operate as mediators of two 
interdependent sides of the market, capturing value from the interactions of platform 
producers and consumers (Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
Platform owners’ ability to mediate interactions efficiently and at scale, depends 
to a large extent on the number of both platform producers and consumers (Van Alstyne 
et al., 2016). This is true in many different types of P2P platforms. In P2P lending, the 
more lenders there are, the more likely borrowers will get credit. On the other hand, the 
more borrowers are present, the more likely a lender will have consumers to lend to at 
their desired risk level (Mariotto, 2016). Similarly, Apple’s App Store enables app 
developers and app users to connect. The app developers represent the supply side of this 
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two-sided market and the app users represent the demand side. When there are more apps 
available via the developers, there are more incentives for app users to use the App Store. 
When there are more app users using the App Store, app developers are incentivized to 
create appealing apps (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). While speaking of P2P lending, 
Mariotto (2016) states, “the higher the number on each side, the higher the probability of 
a successful match between a borrower and a lender and the higher the volume of 
transactions” (p. 38). This can be generalized to other P2P contexts because  in any P2P 
context, if the balance of enticing enough supply and demand fails, the entire platform 
could fail due to lack of transactions (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). 
With an understanding of how platforms work in two-sided markets, it is 
important to note there are different types of platforms. The previously mentioned 
examples of payment system operators and gaming consoles are innovation platforms. 
These platforms provide “technological building blocks” that a producer can build onto in 
order to provide for a consumer (Evans & Gawer, 2016:6). Platforms like Airbnb (P2P 
home sharing), eBay (P2P e-commerce), Uber (P2P ridesharing), and Prosper (P2P 
lending) are transaction platforms (Evans & Gawer, 2016). Transaction platforms, the 
focus of this analysis, consist of “a technology, product or service that acts as a conduit 
(or intermediary) facilitating exchange or transactions between different users, buyers, or 
suppliers” (Evans & Gawer, 2016:9). While transaction facilitation is the central goal of 
firms operating transaction platforms, the producers on those platforms are responsible 
for communicating trustworthiness and quality to consumers. By using signaling theory, 




When actors in economic transactions have incomplete information about a 
product, the transaction is considered to contain imperfect information (Lee et al., 2005). 
Imperfect, or asymmetric, information occurs when one party has more knowledge of a 
product’s quality than the other. In a market setting, the party with more knowledge is 
usually the producer (Lee et al., 2005), who, if honest, must work to minimize the 
information asymmetry. Marketers portray their product and themselves in a way that 
encourages purchase (Lee et al., 2005). This process allows consumers to more easily 
classify the producer as trustworthy or untrustworthy and evaluate the quality of the 
product sold (Lee et al., 2005).  
In signaling theory, there exists a signaler, signal, and receiver. The signaler is the 
insider who has information about a product, skill, or service that needs to be conveyed to 
the receiver (Connelly et al., 2011). These insiders use the information they have to 
communicate the quality of their products and distinguish themselves from untrustworthy 
merchants (Lee et al., 2005). This information is often communicated in the form of 
market signals which transfer information from the producer to the consumer in order to 
communicate information about a product (Lee et al., 2005). In this framework, 
consumers are receivers who lack the necessary information to judge the quality of what 
is being pursued and the receiver uses the aforementioned signals to assist in the 
decision-making process (Connelly et al., 2011).  
In digital markets, signals are important because the absence of a physical space 
between buyer and seller eliminates observable cues like body language gained from in-
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person interactions (Dimoka et al., 2012). Because of the distance between producer and 
consumer, the risk of adverse outcomes for the consumer is heightened (Lee et al., 2005). 
Thus, the consumer’s burden is that they are in search of quality (Akerlof, 1970). This 
uncertainty, presence of risk, and search for quality leads to the necessity of producer 
signals.  
Signaling in Peer-to-Peer Contexts 
Signals are important in peer-to-peer platforms because they are a useful 
evaluation tool in many P2P contexts. In P2P crowdfunding, where crowdfunding 
platforms bring together entrepreneurs and potential funders, signals help potential 
funders evaluate the quality of the projects being proposed (Kromidha & Robson, 2016). 
Signals of engagement like updates, comments on the project website, linked friends, and 
number of shares are correlates of success on P2P crowdfunding platforms (Kromidha & 
Robson, 2016). Also, in order to reduce uncertainty, producers on eBay’s two-sided 
market signal credibility and quality by using the platform’s features (Lu et al., 2009). 
Some producers engage in the pursuit of eBay promotions for their products in order to 
signal to consumers that their products are of quality (Melnik et al., 2011). Those who 
signal successfully the high quality of their products can typically charge higher prices 
and see better outcomes such as more revenue (Brown, 2015). 
In P2P home sharing, homeowners signal trust through reputation signals. Guests 
must evaluate these homeowners through signals about their competency and credibility 
in order to proceed with a purchase. Guest satisfaction is in part derived by trust 
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established through the signals on a homeowner’s profile (Moon et al., 2019). Recently, 
trust signals like host locality, superhost status, response rate, length of tenure, and 
verification have been used when studying P2P home sharing, particularly on Airbnb 
(Xie & Mao, 2017). Specifically, Xie and Mao (2017) find that potential guests use the 
previously mentioned signals to judge the quality of hosts, proving trust facilitation 
through signals helps foster positive outcomes. 
In P2P lending, lenders often have imperfect information about borrowers. This 
leads to information asymmetries because a borrower knows their own value and risk 
while the lender does not (Mariotto, 2016). Thus, the burden is on the borrower to 
convince the lender of their quality in this two-sided P2P market. In P2P lending, 
platforms like Prosper and LendingClub use social media-like features in order to aid in 
the resolution of information asymmetry (Mariotto, 2016). In this context, a borrowers’ 
social ties act as a signal of their viability and credit quality (Lin et al., 2013). 
Specifically, on the Prosper platform, borrowers with friends on their profile had better 
outcomes, especially when those friends came with signals of quality like being a prolific 
lender (Lin et al., 2013). Another signal of credibility in this context includes borrower 
history, which helps lenders navigate a space in which information is scarce and risk is 
high (Cai et al., 2016). 
Whether participating in P2P lending, crowdfunding, or home sharing, those with 
imperfect information consistently seek signals to aid in decreasing information 
asymmetry and decision making. When these signals are properly used, research shows 
that outcomes on the supply side of these two-sided markets are typically more positive. 
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Signaling theory poses that signals communicated by producers impact consumer 
behavior by reducing uncertainty and signaling quality (Lee et al., 2005). Those who 
perform well on platform enabled signals typically have better product performance 
outcomes (Brown, 2015). Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: Producers’ reputation signals have a positive relationship with product 
performance.  
Product Type 
Through the previously mentioned examples, it is clear there exists a variety of 
producer signals, some of which are platform specific. Because of this, producer signal 
importance may depend on the types of products offered on platforms. Studies on market 
segmentation on P2P platforms show that certain classes of products draw in certain 
customers. The simplest example comes from an e-commerce context where producers’ 
use of different promotional tools for new and used items suggests their awareness of 
potential differences in marketing different types of product (Melnik et al., 2011). 
Examples that include varying levels of physical risk based on product type come from 
ridesharing and home sharing contexts. 
Ridesharing platforms such as Uber and Lyft, allow producers to offer different 
types of products. Uber Pool and Lyft Shared (formerly Lyft Line) are available as 
flexible, budget-friendly options that allow users to share rides with others (Pratt et al., 
2019; Sarriera et al., 2017; Tell, 2015). For riders who want an elevated experience with 
increased privacy, Uber X and Lyft Lux may be the preferred option (Pratt et al., 2019).  
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On home sharing platforms, consumers typically have the option of choosing a 
shared room or an entire home. Shared rooms typically cater to less formal consumers 
who are more likely to be men, low income, less concerned with cleanliness, traveling 
alone or with a large group (as opposed to with a partner), and most importantly, open to 
social interaction (Lutz & Newlands, 2018). Entire home consumers are typically high 
income and highly educated individuals more likely to be traveling with a partner or 
spouse and more likely to be uncomfortable with social interaction (Lutz & Newlands, 
2018). Thus, shared rooms have an increased risk due to the presence of other consumers 
renting the same space, while entire homes contain less risk due to the privacy 
guaranteed.  
If different parts of the demand side of two-sided markets tend to select different 
products, we can expect producer signals to have different relationships with product 
performance based on the product.  The mentioned examples show how high-risk 
products may contrast with low-risk products that are meant for consumers looking for a 
more formal experience or willing to spend more. Logically, the higher the physical risk 
consumers face while using a product, the more assurances they need that the risks will 
not materialize, and the more they may depend more on producer signals to relieve their 
concerns. As a result, the relationship between producer signals and product performance 
is expected to be stronger for high-risk products. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H2: Consumers’ physical risk positively moderates the relationship between 
producer signals and performance. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data  
To examine how producer signals contribute to product performance and how 
different types of products influence the relationship between producer signals and 
product performance, this study uses data from Airbnb, a P2P home sharing platform. 
Airbnb allows homeowners to rent out their spaces to travelers/guests (Moon et al., 
2019). Due to its success and large data footprint, Airbnb has been the focal point of 
those studying P2P platforms and the sharing economy. On Airbnb, typically the 
producer (also known as the host) is a person, rather than a company, however property 
management companies are joining the platform as well (Cox, 2019). This P2P model in 
which guests do not interact with formal hospitality workers or well-known chains has 
been the subject of many recent works that focus primarily on the relationship between 
hosts, who share their spaces, and guests, who rent out those spaces. 
 Specifically, the data come from Inside Airbnb, a non-profit originally put forth 
to understand the impact of Airbnb on neighborhoods (Cox, 2019). Inside Airbnb 
accumulates Airbnb’s publicly available data, which contain consumer ratings, consumer 
reviews, host information, and listing information (Cox, 2019). Recently, this dataset has 
been used for academic studies that focus on topics relevant to P2P platforms and the 
sharing economy (e.g. Xie & Mao, 2017; Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; 
Zhao & Rahman, 2019). 
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Because of how Inside Airbnb collects listings, not all cities in the United States 
are represented. However, based on Teubner (2018)’s methodology, this selection of 
cities and their surrounding metropolitan areas accounts for at least 25% of the United 
States population (over 80 million people). This analysis includes seven more cities than 
Teubner (2018)’s analysis to increase regional diversity and nationwide generalizability. 
Specifically, this analysis focuses on listings from 23 locations in the United States, 
which cover a total of 232,347 listings in Asheville, Austin, Boston, Broward County (Ft. 
Lauderdale, FL), Cambridge, Chicago, Clark County (Las Vegas, NV), Columbus, 
Denver, Los Angeles, Nashville, New Jersey (statewide), New Orleans, New York City, 
Oakland, Portland, Rhode Island (statewide), San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, 
Seattle, Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN) and Washington D.C. Following 
list-wise deletion of missing values and other measurement considerations, a final sample 
of 77,445 listings is achieved.  
The decrease from 232,347 listings to 77,445 listings occurs because of three 
criteria. Listings that have been on the site for only a few months are more likely to have 
few or no reviews. Thus, the first criterion for inclusion into the analysis is that listings 
must be at least one year old. Second, because the Superhost badge was not consistently 
on Airbnb until 2015, listings in existence before 2015 were dropped. Third, listings with 
prices below $10 and above $10,000 were dropped. Airbnb has these as price limits; 







The dependent variables are measures of product performance. In the context of 
Airbnb, product performance refers to the performance of a host’s listing for an 
accommodation available for rent. Thus, the term “listing performance” is used. This 
study measures listing performance in two ways based on the established importance of 
product quality and prominence for product performance.  
Based on prior research, the first measure of listing performance is captured by 
number of reviews. Benítez-Aurioles (2018) uses number of reviews as a proxy for how 
many visitors have stayed in a listing. Additionally, Zhang et al. (2018) uses number of 
reviews as a stand in for number of bookings when predicting trust towards hosts on 
Airbnb. A 2014 meta-analysis examining how online product reviews impact sales 
compiled a list of studies measuring retail performance (Floyd et al., 2014). Of the five 
studies in the hospitality industry, two use reviews per room as a proxy measure of sales 
(Floyd et al., 2014). Across industries, Floyd et al. (2014) note that many studies resort to 
using proxy measures of sales. Also, there is a relationship between number of reviews 
and room sales, further justifying review volume as a measure of listing performance 
(Lee et al., 2015). This is also seen in other parts of the sharing economy, specifically 
concerning meal sharing, where number of thank you notes (similar to reviews) is a 
predictor of sales performance (Huurne et al., 2018).  
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While number of reviews is a suitable proxy, researchers claim this measure 
captures the lower bound of number of reviews because not all users leave a review, with 
review rates ranging from 30% to 70% as of 2017 (Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Cox, 2019; 
Teubner, 2018). Because product performance will be measured by number of reviews, 
listings under one year old at the time of scraping have been dropped. This is because, 
logically, listings that are new to the site will have fewer reviews than those that have 
been around longer. Lastly, number of reviews is log transformed to correct for positive 
skewness. 
The second measure of listing performance is a listing’s overall rating score. 
Rating scores are indicators of a listing’s quality. In a study of P2P lending, borrowers’ 
past performance helps potential lenders evaluate their reputations (Jie et al., 2019). In 
the context of Airbnb, past performance is evaluated by consumer reviews, specifically 
rating scores where users evaluate an accommodation’s cleanliness, check-in, and value 
(Zhang, 2019). A rating score is a signal of product quality (Taeuscher, 2019) and it is 
related to sales performance. Though the product is an extension of the seller, the seller 
cannot truly communicate the quality of the product with 100% certainty (Dimoka et al., 
2012). Therefore, consumer reviews exist. Consumers judge the quality of their 
experience which implies producer and product performance. Hotel industry studies find 
that these consumer ratings positively correlate with online room sales (Ogut & Tas, 




A listing’s overall rating score is provided by Inside Airbnb. This measure goes 
from 20 to 100 and is based on the average of a listing’s cleanliness rating, check-in 
rating, location rating, accuracy rating, communication rating, and value rating. The 
variable corresponds to number of stars and as Teubner (2018) explains, “scores between 
≥75 and 84 yield a star rating of 4.0, scores between ≥85 and 94 yield a star rating of 4.5, 
and so on” (pg. 267). Due to a heavy left skew, this variable is reverse-coded and log 
transformed. This transformed version of the variable replaces the original variable in all 
the regression analyses included in this paper. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables capture the signals that Airbnb’s producers (hosts) 
send to consumers (travelers) to convince them of their reliability and trustworthiness. 
These signals include membership length, superhost status, responsiveness, and identity 
verification. These signals are consistently used in studies of the Airbnb platform 
(Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Moon et al., 2019; Zhao & Rahman, 2019).  
Membership length refers to how long a host has been active on Airbnb; a guest 
typically sees a phrase like “Joined in 2017” (Airbnb.com). Researchers consistently use 
learning theory to propose supported hypotheses concerning the length of membership 
and its impact on performance (Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019). This suggests 
length of membership should be an important producer signal to when it comes to listing 
performance on Airbnb.  
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 Identity verification lets the consumers know whether producers have provided 
and verified a government ID. Overall, Airbnb guests value credibility and dyadic trust 
when booking (Moon et al., 2019). There are two studies of Airbnb that address this, one 
in a western context and one in a non-western context. Though results are mixed on 
whether ID verification is an important producer signal for listing performance (see Xie 
& Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019), ID verification is consistently used in studies of 
Airbnb that examine how producers’ attributes impact product performance. The signal is 
a binary variable, with 1 indicating the host has an ID verification on file, and 0 
indicating the opposite. The signal is portrayed on host profiles with a check mark and 
the word “verified” (Airbnb.com).  
A superhost is a host who has maintained a good reputation on Airbnb according 
to Airbnb’s criteria (Airbnb.com). Zhang et al. (2018) finds the superhost badge to be one 
of the most important parts of reputation building on the Airbnb platform. Superhosts are 
expected to have at least 10 transactions completed, a review rate of at least 50%, a high 
response rate, a low cancelation rate, and consistently perform well in reviews (Zhang et 
al., 2018). Constructed as a binary variable, the Superhost variable is 1 when the host is a 
Superhost, and 0 when not. This signal was not consistently on the platform until midway 
through 2014, so listings created before then were dropped. 
The responsiveness variable measures how quickly hosts respond to customer 
inquiries. In a study of P2P interactions on Airbnb, researchers conclude that guests value 
communicative hosts and put high stakes on encounter satisfaction (Moon, et al., 2019). 
Thus, host responsiveness is an important communication signal crucial to building trust 
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and achieving high listing performance (Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2019; 
Zhang et al., 2018). For ease of interpretation, the measure is a binary variable, with 1 
indicating a host “typically responds within an hour”, and 0 meaning the host takes 
longer than one hour to respond..  
Moderator Variable 
Product risk is hypothesized to be a moderator in the relationship between 
producer signals and product performance. In the context of Airbnb, the products are the 
different types of accommodation available for rent. This recoded binary variable 
considers whether an accommodation is an entire home (1), or a room rental (0). Entire 
homes are proxies for low risk products whereas room rentals are proxies for high risk 
products. Home listings carry the least amount of risk because consumers rent the entire 
apartment or home during their stay and do not come into regular contact with the host or 
other tenants. On the other hand, room rentals (private or shared) contain varying levels 
of physical risk due to the potential presence of the homeowner and other travelers in the 
space (Airbnb.com).  
Control Variables 
Product attributes are control variables. In the context of Airbnb, these are listing 
attributes. When studying Airbnb, Benítez-Aurioles (2018) uses how many guests can be 
accommodated, number of bathrooms, and number of bedrooms as control variables that 
imply listing size. Researchers doing similar analyses control for number of beds as well 
(Xie & Mao, 2017; Zhao & Rahman, 2018). Due to multicollinearity concerns identified 
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by high variance inflation factor scores, number of beds is included as the main listing 
size attribute with bedrooms, bathrooms, and accommodates left out to increase 
parsimoniousness.  
Other consistently used controls include price which is log transformed to correct 
for positive skewness, and to a lesser extent cancellation and instant booking policies 
(Xie & Mao, 2017; Benítez-Aurioles, 2018; Teubner, 2018; Zhao & Rahman, 2019). To 
ensure accurate analysis, cases with prices below $10 and above $10,000 are dropped. 
These are the minimum and maximum prices allowable on Airbnb’s website. Because 
some cases had prices at $0 as well as a few over $10,000, I dropped those cases to 
ensure accuracy and consistency.  
The cancellation policy variable is recoded following the example of Teubner 
(2018), who created dummy variables for whether a listing had a flexible, moderate, or 
strict cancellation policy. One could view this variable as a reflection of the host’s overall 
personality on the platform, but since it is listing specific rather than host specific, it is 
treated as a listing attribute. The same could be said for instant booking policy. This 
variable measures whether a listing can be booked instantly, without a host’s approval 
(Airbnb.com). Lastly, dummy variables are created to represent each of the five United 
States regions and due to the inclusion of number of reviews, the age of a listing in years 




Univariate analyses are produced to provide an overview of the data. Descriptive 
statistics can be found below. General Estimating Equations are also used with 
adjustments made for clustering to analyze the relationship between producer signals, 
product attributes, product type, and product performance. The clustering issue is due to 
the ability of hosts to have multiple listings, meaning not all listings are independent of 
each other. Three models are estimated for each of the two dependent variables. 
Logarithmic transformations are used on both dependent variables to address skewing 
issues. Because of this, when results are discussed, effects are presented in percent 
change form. To calculate percent change, the following formula is used: 
(𝑒𝛽 − 1) ∗ 100 
The first model estimates the strength of the relationships between producer signals and 
performance. This provides evidence for the importance of signals to the supply side of 
P2P platforms and effects and R2 values will be discussed. The second model 
incorporates the standard control variables which consist of listing attributes. Finally, a 
third model introduces interaction terms and tests the moderating effect of 
accommodation type on the relationship between producer signals and performance. 
Detailed regression models are found below:  
M1: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽
3
(𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽
4
(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖 
 
M2: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽
3




















(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽
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(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝜖 
 
M3: Log(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽3(𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽4(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑒𝑑𝑠) + 𝛽6(log (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)) +
𝛽7(𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽8(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝛽9(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽10(𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑒) +
𝛽11(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽12(𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽13(𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽14(𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽15(𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽16(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽17(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽18(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) + 𝛽19(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽20(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝜖 
 
M1: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽
3
(𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +  𝛽
4
(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) +  𝜖 
 
M2: : 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽
3


















(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽
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(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝜖 
 
M3: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +
 𝛽
3
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(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝛽
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(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡) +
𝛽
18
(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝) +  𝛽
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(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
 𝛽
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The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the number of reviews is positively 
skewed with a mean of 48.81, a standard deviation of 59.84 and ranging from 0 to 612. 
About 68% of listings are entire homes and 32% are rooms. For rating score, the average 
accommodation has a 95.47 score, with a minimum of 20 and maximum of 100 which is 
negatively skewed. The average host has a membership length of 4.33 years. Also, 49% 
of hosts are Superhosts, 75% of hosts have the “responds within an hour” message 
present on their profile, and 54% of hosts are identity verified. An average listing has 
2.17 beds, costs $176.40 per night, and offers 30 amenities. As for the cancellation 
policies, 14% of listings have a flexible cancellation policy, 35% have a moderate policy, 
and 51% have a strict policy. Additionally, 46% of listings are available for instant 
booking. Lastly, the regional split of listings goes as follows: 14% of listings are in the 
South, 7% are in the Southwest, 7% are in the Midwest, 43% are on the West Coast, and 
29% are on the East Coast.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean* Std. Dev. 
Number of reviews 0 612 48.81 59.84 
Rating Score 20 100 95.47 5.46 
Superhost - - .49 - 
Membership Length 0.27 11.37 4.33 1.87 
Identity Verified - - .54 - 
Responsiveness - - .75 - 
Entire Homes - - .68 - 
Beds 0 40 2.17 1.77 
Price 10 10000 176.4 259.92 
Cancellation Policy     
   Flexible - - .14 - 












Regression Analysis  
Regressing Number of Reviews (Product Prominence) on Signals 
Due to the large sample size, widespread significance occurs. Therefore, when 
presenting results, the effect sizes (shown in percent change) are the focal point. Model 1 
in Table 2 estimates the relationship between producer signals alone and performance as 
measured by logged number of reviews. Model 1 has an R-squared value of .180 and all 
signals are significant at or below the p<.05 level. This suggests producer signals alone 
explain 18% of the variance in number of reviews. When controlling for other producer 
signals, the presence of the Superhost badge gains hosts 103.40% more reviews than 
those without the signal. As for membership, for each year of host membership, number 
of reviews falls by 1.98%. Similar to the Superhost badge, the identity verification badge 
also has a positive relationship with number of reviews. When host profiles have identity 
verification, they receive 13.88% more reviews. Finally, the strongest producer signal is 
responsiveness. When a host’s profile indicates that they respond within an hour of 
inquiries, their listings are expected to receive 131.64% more reviews than those who do 
not. 
   Strict - - .51 - 
Amenities 1 111 30.45 11.54 
Listing Age 1 4.63 2.35 0.97 
Instant Booking - - .46 - 
Region     
   South - - .14 - 
   Southwest - - .7 - 
   Midwest - - .7 - 
   West Coast - - .43 - 
   East Coast - - .29 - 
N=77445 
*Mean column contains proportion values for categorical variables (Superhost, Identity 
Verified, Responsiveness, Entire Homes, Cancellation Policy, Instant Booking, and Region). 
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Logged Number of Reviews on Signals 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter 𝛽 SE 𝛽 SE 𝛽 SE 
Superhost 0.71*** 0.03 0.60*** 0.02 0.58*** 0.03 
Membership -0.02* 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
Identity Verification 0.13*** 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.03 
Responsiveness 0.84*** 0.03 0.71*** 0.03 0.72*** 0.03 
Beds   0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 
Logged Price   -0.49*** 0.02 -0.49*** 0.02 
Flexible Cancellation   0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Moderate Cancellation   0.26*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.02 
Amenities   0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 
Listing Age   0.44*** 0.01 0.44*** 0.01 
Instant Bookable   0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 
East Coast   0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 
South   0.07* 0.03 0.06* 0.03 
Midwest   -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 
Southwest   -0.14*** 0.04 -0.14*** 0.04 
Entire Home (EH)   0.39*** 0.02 0.50*** 0.06 
EH * Superhost     0.02 0.03 
EH * Membership     -0.02* 0.01 
EH * Identity Verification     0.00 0.04 
EH * Responsiveness     -0.02 0.05 
       
(Intercept) 2.48*** 3.20*** 3.13*** 
(Scale) 1.43 1.14 1.14 
R2 .18 .35 .35 
F 4259.67*** 2582.67*** 2068.25*** 
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001 
R2 values and F-statistics from OLS equivalent. 
 
Model 2 introduces listing attributes into the model and the R-squared value rises 
to .35. This suggests that producer signals along with listing attributes account for 35% of 
the variance in number of reviews, an improvement of 16 percentage points. For the 
Superhost badge, Model 2 still presents a strong positive relationship, but the effect 
dropped by 23.23 percentage points from 105.44% to 82.21%. As for membership, the 
effect actually grew from the first to the second model. Instead of a decrease of 1.98% for 
each year of host membership on Airbnb, listings can expect a decrease of 5.82% for 
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each year of membership. Originally a positive effect in Model 1, identity verification 
saw a reversal of its effect to negative. Thus, when controlling for listing attributes and 
other signals, listings with the identity verification signal receive 3.92% less reviews than 
those without it. Finally, similar to the Superhost badge, the impact of responsiveness on 
number of reviews remained positive and decreased in effect by almost 30 percentage 
points from 131.64% to 103.40%. 
 The listing attributes in Model 2 are all related to number of reviews in the 
expected ways. As number of beds, amenities, and listing age increase by one unit, 
number of reviews increase by 3.05%, 2.02%, and 55.27%, respectively. For each percent 
increase in price, number of reviews drops by .48%. When a listing has a moderate 
cancellation policy compared to a strict policy, it is expected to receive 29.70% more 
reviews. When a listing has instant bookings enabled, they are expected to receive 
34.99% more reviews than those that do not allow instant bookings. Some regional 
variables were also significant. Compared to the West Coast, listings in the South and on 
the East Coast receive 7.25% and 6.18% more reviews, respectively. Additionally, 
Southwestern listings receive 13.06% fewer reviews than West Coast listings. The 
variables for Midwestern region and flexible cancellation policy were not significant. 
Finally, when a rental is an entire home as opposed to a room, it receives 47.70% more 
reviews. 
Model 3 adds interaction between accommodation type and each of the four major 
producer signals. This analysis only produces significant interaction between entire homes 
and membership. This suggests that the effects of the membership signal differ between 
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entire home bookings and room bookings. For entire home bookings, there is a penalty on 
the membership signal. This means the negative relationship between membership and 
number of reviews is stronger for entire homes than for rooms. 
Regressing Rating Score (Product Quality) on Signals 
Model 1 in Table 3 estimates the relationship between producer signals and 
performance as measured by rating score. Due to a left skew, the rating score measure 
was reverse-coded before its logarithmic transformation. Therefore, high rating scores 
correspond to poor performance and low rating scores correspond to high performance. 
Thus, a decrease in the reverse-coded rating score is associated with an increase in the 
pre-transformation rating score.  
The model shows that the producer signals alone account for 10% of the variance 
in rating score. In this base model, all producer signals are significant. Superhost status is 
associated with a higher rating score as the coefficient indicates that Superhost status is 
associated with a 60.94% decrease on the reverse-coded rating scale. Membership length 
is associated with a 1% decrease on the reverse-coded rating scale for each additional 
year, suggesting higher rating scores for longer membership. Identity verification is also 
associated with higher rating scores as demonstrated by a 12.19% decrease on the 
reverse-coded rating scale. Finally, responsiveness is negatively related to rating score, 
with the signal leading to a 68% increase on the reverse-coded rating scale.  
Model 2 adds listing attributes and accounts for 16% of the variance in rating 
score, a 6-percentage point increase. In the model, all producer signals maintain their 
statistical significance. For the Superhost badge, when controlling for other signals and 
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listing attributes, its presence is associated with 56.83% decrease on the reverse-coded 
rating score, maintaining its association with higher rating scores. For membership, each 
additional year a host has been on the platform, the reverse-coded rating score falls by 
2.96%. For identity verification, when the signal is present, the reverse-coded rating score 
falls by 16.47% and for responsiveness, the reverse-coded rating score increases by  
56.83%. 
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Logged Rating Score on Signals† 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Parameter 𝛽 SE 𝛽 SE 𝛽 SE 
Superhost -0.94*** 0.02 -0.84*** 0.02 -0.84*** 0.02 
Membership -0.01* 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.01 
Identity Verification -0.13*** 0.02 -0.18*** 0.02 -0.16*** 0.03 
Responsiveness 0.52*** 0.02 0.45*** 0.02 0.45*** 0.03 
Beds   0.08*** 0.01 0.08*** 0.01 
Logged Price   -0.47*** 0.02 -0.47*** 0.02 
Flexible Cancellation   -0.34*** 0.02 -0.34*** 0.02 
Moderate Cancellation   -0.18*** 0.02 -0.18 0.01 
Amenities   -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
Listing Age   0.22*** 0.01 0.22*** 0.01 
Instant Bookable   0.33*** 0.02 0.33*** 0.02 
East Coast   0.17*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 
South   -0.30*** 0.02 -0.30*** 0.02 
Midwest   -0.13*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.03 
Southwest   -0.32*** 0.03 -0.32*** 0.03 
Entire Home (EH)   0.29*** 0.02 0.25*** 0.05 
EH * Superhost     0.01 0.03 
EH * Membership     0.01 0.01 
EH * Identity Verification     -0.03 0.03 
EH * Responsiveness     0.00 0.04 
       
(Intercept) 0.90*** 2.58*** 2.61*** 
(Scale) 2.29 2.13 2.13 
R2 .10 .16 .16 
F 2085.51*** 935.50*** 748.62*** 
* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001 
R2   values and F-statistics from OLS equivalent. 
†: Original score inverted before log transformation. 
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 The listing attributes in Model 2 are also worth noting. All attributes are 
significant. For each additional bed and additional year a listing has been active, the 
reverse-coded rating score increases by 8.32% and 24.61%, respectively, suggesting 
lower pre-transformation rating scores for these attributes. For each additional percent 
increase in price and each additional amenity, the reverse-coded rating score falls by 
.47% and 1%, respectively, suggesting higher pre-transformation rating scores for these 
attributes. Also, both flexible and moderate cancellation policies have a positive effect on 
pre-transformation rating scores. Concerning the reverse-coded rating score, flexible 
policies receive a 28.82% lower score than strict policies and moderate policies receive 
16.47% lower score. Additionally, when a listing has instant booking enabled, it receives 
a 39.10% higher reverse-coded rating score. Regional variables show that the South, 
Midwest, and Southwest listings receive 25.92%. 12.19%, and 27.39% lower reverse-
coded rating scores than West Coast listings, respectively and East Coast listings receive 
18.53% higher reverse-coded rating scores than West Coast listings. When an 
accommodation is an entire home, rather than a room rental, it receives a reverse-coded 
rating score that is 33.64% higher. Finally, Model 3 adds interaction between 
accommodation type and producer signals. The model produces no significant interaction 







DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study diverges from previous research by considering both product quality 
and product prominence as measures of product performance on P2P platforms, and thus 
provides a more inclusive and robust assessment of product performance.  The central 
research questions for this study are: how do platform producers’ reputation signals 
contribute to the performance of their products on peer-to-peer platforms and how does 
product type moderate the relationship between platform producers’ reputation signals 
and product performance? These questions are addressed by investigating two 
hypotheses: producer signals have a positive relationship with performance (H1) and 
consumers’ physical risk positively moderates the relationship between producer signals 
and performance (H2). In this analysis, performance is measured in two ways: product 
quality and product prominence. Product prominence is measured through number of 
reviews and product quality is measured through rating score. Because of this, separate 
models are estimated for each of the performance measures.     
Hypothesis one, which states producer signals have a positive relationship with 
performance receives mixed support. In the product prominence analysis, the signals in 
the base model overall are sufficient correlates of product prominence. However, only 
three of four producer signals (Superhost, responsiveness, and identity verification) are 
positively related to prominence, while one (membership) is weakly and negatively 
related to prominence. One potential explanation for membership length’s negative 
relationship could be that hosts that are newer to the platform are doing more to 
encourage reviews so that they can build up their reputation. With previously mentioned 
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research pointing out review rates range from 30-70%, it is easy to imagine newer hosts 
striving for the high end of this range in review completion. Thus, logically, hosts who 
have been around longer would be less concerned with number of reviews due to the 
higher number of reviews that comes with being active on the platform for a longer 
period.  
When considering the product attributes, identity verification, originally a positive 
correlate, goes negative and loses its significance. This suggests product attributes may 
play a large role in determining producer signal usefulness. In the product quality 
analysis, all producer signals are significant. One of the producer signals, membership, 
has a negative effect. When considering product attributes, the relationships remain the 
same. 
Overall, these mixed results for hypothesis one suggest most producer signals are 
positively related to performance, while certain producer signals may matter for product 
performance based on product attributes. The strong influence of product attributes like 
cancellation policy and instant booking availability suggest that practical features such as 
policies (cancellation, return, warranties, etc.) may be more important to performance 
than producer signals like identity verification and membership length. This is consistent 
with studies that have shown price, location, instant booking, cancellation policy, and 
renting policies to be important correlates of performance (Benetiz-Airoles, 2018; 
Guttentag et al., 2018; Jang et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2019). 
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 Hypothesis two, which states that consumers’ privacy risk positively moderates 
the relationship between producer signals and performance is weakly supported by only 
one of eight interaction terms. The significant interaction present is between membership 
length and entire home rentals. The relationship overall is negative, but the penalty is less 
for high risk products. When one books a room rather than an entire home, they may face 
a higher level of physical risk because they are often sharing spaces with other customers 
and even the host (Airbnb). In markets that require trust, the consumer must minimize the 
risk of adverse outcomes (Lee et al., 2005). Because room rentals are perceived as riskier 
(Lutz & Newlands, 2018), those booking them may rely on membership length as a risk 
reduction tool. Thus, this finding supports hypothesis two. 
While there is support for hypothesis two, the remaining seven interaction terms 
are insignificant. This lack of interaction is in line with an early study by Gregg & 
Walczak (2008) which found no support for interaction between producer signals and 
product type in a P2P e-commerce context.  
While many of this study’s results are mixed, they still draw attention to the 
potential impact producer signals can have on the performance of platform producers and 
their products on peer-to-peer platforms. This insight is in line with previous studies that 
find producers’ characteristics and firms’ e-image influence how consumer evaluate 
products and services prior to purchasing them (Gregg & Walczak, 2008; Huurne, M. et 
al., 2018). This is evidenced through producer signals’ large impact on performance even 
after considering the impact of product attributes like price, location, and policies.  
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As with any research, this study has certain limitations. First, related to the 
results, causality issues may have caused certain producer signals to be negatively related 
to performance. For example, in the product quality model, responsiveness was 
negatively related to performance. A potential explanation for this is that hosts who have 
low performance are working harder to achieve the responsiveness signal, thus 
responsiveness is associated with low performing listings.  
Another variable related limitation concern is the Superhost signal. While most 
research considers the producer signal while looking at performance in this context, it is 
important to note it may have an influence on the model because it is in part achieved 
through hitting certain performance metrics that are related to the dependent variables. 
Specifically, the Superhost criteria requiring a high review rate, a high response rate, and 
high performance in reviews are concerning (Airbnb.com). 
 Although Airbnb is one of the most popular P2P platforms, these results may 
have limited generalizability outside of home sharing platforms. Although this study 
assesses both number of reviews and ratings to provide a more comprehensive 
assessment than previous studies, measuring performance on P2P platforms with rating 
scores and reviews may still be inadequate. Researchers find support for a “don’t-want-
to-complain-bias” which suggests the accuracy of performance measures like rating 
scores and reviews may be tainted because of social pressure in P2P markets that lead to 
fewer negative reviews (Berg et al., 2020).  
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Despite these limitations, overall, this research helps extend the P2P platform 
literature by providing useful insights to platform owners, producers, and consumers 
concerning how both producer- and product-related signals can impact product 
performance. Producers on two-sided platforms should be mindful of their performance 
on signal measures as well as how they may vary based on the type of product they are 
offering. Furthermore, platforms and producers can increase their revenue by embracing 
flexibility. This is evidenced through the strong impact of transaction related variables 
like cancellation policy and instant booking on product performance in the analysis. 
Platform owners and the demand side of platform markets should also invest in 
promoting certain types of producer signals. On Airbnb, this study finds that the 
Superhost badge was a consistently strong correlate of product performance. Airbnb 
invests a lot in this signal and producers must work hard to achieve it. Because of this, 
the signal’s visibility and cost are high. Costly and highly visible producer signals are 
better quality than cheap and less visible producer signals (Connelly et al., 2011). 
Because of this, platform owners should work to create producer signals with high 
visibility on their platforms with strict criteria in order to better facilitate transactions.  
Responsiveness was another strong correlate of performance, specifically 
considering product prominence. This measure, which considers whether a host responds 
to accommodation requests within an hour, is important to the booking process. Platform 
owners should invest in making communication between the two sides of their markets 
easy, quick, and often. Products whose producer communicates quickly with interested 
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consumers likely complete more transactions, earning both the platform owner and 
producer more income. 
This work provides an update to the signaling theory framework and conceptual 
models proposed by Xie and Mao (2017) and Zhao and Rahman (2019). This is achieved 
by considering the importance of product type as established by research suggesting key 
differences in consumers based on product offerings. Specifically, this research proposes 
looking at products through the lens of physical risk for consumers. Though the 
moderation hypothesis received marginal support, this analysis does lend support to 
updating, or at least considering product type when discussing the signaling framework. 
While we cannot say that overall higher risk products are more positively impacted by 
producer signals than lower risk products, we can conclude that signal performance 
varies slightly by product type, as evidenced through the interaction between membership 
length and entire homes. Further research on other platforms, products, and signals 
should be conducted to lend more support for this assumption. Specifically, studies 
utilizing P2P lending platforms, ridesharing platforms, and resource sharing platforms 
may provide sufficient evidence that producer signals should be understood as context- 
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